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‘Don’t read the comments!’
Reflections on writing and publishing feminist socio-legal research as a
young scholar
Emma Cunliffe*

I have found it difficult to know where to begin a response to two reviews that succeed in
being both enormously generous and fully engaged with the work that forms the basis of
Murder, Medicine and Motherhood. It is a standard academic joke that we should count
our blessings if our research is read by long-suffering family members and one or two of
those in our field. With Eve Darian-Smith and Mehera San Roque as my allotted readers,
I am blessed indeed.1 The two reviews published in feminists@law are particularly
exciting for me as they are written by women whose research accomplishments offer
aspirational models for my own work. In a world in which the work of writing reviews
tends to be under-valued, it is a particularly feminist act not just to review a book, but to
write the review as richly and carefully as these two pieces have been written. I will try
to do justice to Darian-Smith and San Roque’s engagement in my response. As well as
responding to Darian-Smith and San Roque’s insights, I have also taken this invitation as
an opportunity to reflect a little on the experience of writing Murder, Medicine and
Motherhood, and on its reception.
In the next section, I trace the choices and unanticipated challenges that structured my
research for Murder, Medicine and Motherhood. Both Darian-Smith and San Roque
have commented on this methodology, and I have noticed that after publication, the scope
and content of the finished product of a research project can seem inevitable. In this
section I try to unpack that appearance, because I think that there can be value in trying to
remember why certain choices were made at certain times, and in pondering the accidents
that prompt turns within one’s work.2 The following section considers the transition that
takes place when a published work enters the field and in fact changes the topic of
research in certain ways. Given the media attention that my conclusions have attracted
*

Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Canada. cunliffe@law.ubc.ca

1

These reviews arose from an author-meets-reader session at the 2012 Law & Society Association
conference. The session was organized by my dear friend Pooja Parmar. I am also tremendously grateful
to Pooja for organizing the panel and to Rosemary Hunter for suggesting that we turn the session into a set
of articles for feminists@law.
2

Simon Halliday and Patrick Schmidt’s excellent work Conducting Law and Society Research: Reflections
on Methods and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) provides a model for such
reflection.
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and the possibility that Kathleen Folbigg’s case may now be reviewed, Murder, Medicine
and Motherhood has to some extent had this effect. In the course of my work becoming a
more public product, my conclusions and my sense of myself as an academic have also
been challenged at times. The rewards and perils of media engagement form a topic that
is occasionally discussed in the literature,3 but rarely with regard to explicitly feminist
work. Given that academics are increasingly exhorted by our employers and research
funding agencies to demonstrate the public relevance of our work, and to engage with
mass media, it seems important to consider the possibilities and the pitfalls of such
engagement from a feminist perspective.

Methodology: A mixture of choice and chance
I am occasionally asked how I chose to focus on the Folbigg trial. The project that
became Murder, Medicine and Motherhood did not begin as a study of a single case. In
2004, as I proposed the doctoral research on which the book was ultimately based, the
English courts, Home Office, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, and Royal
College of Pathologists were responding to the realization that justice had failed Sally
Clark and Angela Cannings. Trupti Patel had been acquitted. Donna Anthony’s
exoneration soon followed, as did a number of reports that sought to understand the
variety of errors that had contributed to these wrongful convictions and to prevent their
recurrence.4 However, with the notable exception of Fiona Raitt and Suzanne Zeedyck’s
insightful article on Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, very little of the commentary on
these cases explored why mothers had been the subject of these errors.5
Meanwhile in Canada, one had to look more closely, but there were glimpses that all was
not well with child homicide prosecutions in Ontario. Judgments had been issued either
acquitting parents and caregivers charged with killing children (and criticizing expert
witnesses along the way),6 or staying prosecutions.7 In other cases, prosecutions had
3

Two of the best examples are Michael McCann and William Haltom, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media
and the Litigation Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) and Austin Sarat and Susan Silbey,
“The Pull of the Policy Audience” (1988) 10 Law & Policy 97.
4

See for example Helene Kennedy, Sudden Unexpected Death in Infancy: A Multi-Agency Protocol for
Care and Investigation (London: Royal College of Pathologists and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child
Health, 2004); Royal Statistical Society, Peter Green, Letter from the President to the Lord Chancellor
regarding the use of statistical evidence in criminal cases (Royal Statistical Society 2002) available online
at http://www.rss.org.uk/uploadedfiles/userfiles/files/Letter-RSS-President-Lord-Chancellor-Sally-Clarkcase.pdf.
5

Fiona Raitt and Suzanne Zeedyck, “Mothers on Trial: Discourses of Cot Death and Munchausen’s
Syndrome by Proxy” (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 257.

6

R v SM 1991 CarswellOnt 3660.
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been withdrawn by the Crown, in some instances after trials had begun.8 In Australia,
coincidence evidence against Tracey Phillips had been excluded by a NSW Supreme
Court Judge, resulting in a withdrawal of charges,9 and charges had been laid against
Carol Matthey for killing four children.10 Kathleen Folbigg had, of course, been
convicted and sentenced for killing her four children.
It was apparent that serious battles were taking place in courtrooms around infant death,
and mothers seemed the most vulnerable participants in these cases (though fathers and
other caregivers were also affected, especially in Canada). It was less clear why these
cases were emerging in several jurisdictions at about the same time. The initial goal of
this project was to understand where this particular trend had come from, to explore how
it might be linked to changing expectations of both motherhood and medical science, and
to think about the connections between these cases and the broader literature on
criminalization.11
The motherhood aspect of the cases seemed crucial to me, from at least two points of
view. First, taking seriously Carol Smart’s suggestion that legal discourse helps to
produce gendered subject identities, I worried about the effects of a turn towards the
punitive in criminal law’s approach to motherhood – and I saw troubling connections
between criminal law and other fields such as family law and welfare law in this regard.12
What disciplining effects might these cases have on other mothers? Secondly, I was also
struck by Shelley Gavigan’s rejoinder to Smart – her suggestion that seeing women
within law as purely a discursive construction overlooked the importance of lived
experience, leaving women with ‘neither agency nor experience’ beyond the discursive
construction of their lives.13 I was interested in both how law produces authoritative
7

R v Kporwodu & Veno (2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff'd (2005), 195 C.C.C. (3d) 501 (Ont.
C.A.).

8

These cases had been reported in Canadian media by 2004, but are conveniently described together in
Stephen T Goudge, Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology Services in Ontario (Toronto:
Queen’s Printer, 2008) volume 2, chapter 2.
9

R v Phillips [1999] NSWSC 1175 (17 December 1999) Bell J.

10

“Authorities were Told of Child Deaths” The Age (29 August 2003) 1.

11

For example, David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2001); Jonathon Simon, Governing through Crime Metaphors (2002) 67 Brooklyn Law
Review 1035. I was also cognizant of the criticisms that had been made by feminists of the inattention to
gender within the criminalization literature. For example Lorraine Gelsthorpe, “Female Offending: A
Theoretical Overview” in G. McIvor (ed.) Women Who Offend (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) at 76.

12

Carol Smart, “The Woman of Legal Discourse” (1992) 1 Social & Legal Studies 1 at 29.

13

Shelley Gavigan, “Mothers, Other Mothers and Others: The Legal Contradictions and Challenges of
Lesbian Parenting” in Dorothy Chunn and Dany Lacombe (eds) Law as a Gendering Practice (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2000) 100 at 105.
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subject identities for women and in how these authorized identities might depart
markedly from the lives of the women they purport to categorize and thereby render
susceptible to judgment.14
I knew I wanted to look at trial transcripts and court records, because I had a sense that
they offered the material from which one might be able to challenge the fluency of law’s
authorized narratives regarding facts and culpability, and I suspected I would need to
mount that challenge at times. The legal archive seemed an obvious starting point for
understanding more about cases than one can learn by reading judgments. However, very
little was written about how one should approach the task of analyzing transcripts and
court records. Accordingly much of my first eighteen months was spent developing a
workable process by analogy with qualitative research methods borrowed mostly from
sociology and history – and influenced especially by the feminist institutional
ethnographies of Dorothy E. Smith.15
A further challenge was presented by difficulties of access. Access problems, which
seem anecdotally to be widespread, but are too rarely described in published work,
excluded the English cases from close analysis, and plagued my attempts to investigate
Matthey.16 The NSW Court Registry was, by contrast, willing to allow me access to its
records in Folbigg and Phillips and able (for a fee) to make copies of those documents I
wished to retain.
In Ontario, strong principles of open justice offered a more stable route to accessing court
records. However, concerns about child homicide cases progressed during 2005 to the
point where the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario announced that he would
14

I have written more about these concerns in Emma Cunliffe, “(This is not a) Story: Using Court Records
to Explore Judicial Narratives in R. v. Kathleen Folbigg” (2007) 27 Australian Feminist Law Journal 71
and with Angela Cameron in “Writing the Circle: Judicially Convened Sentencing Circles and the Textual
Organization of Criminal Justice” (2007) 19 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1.
15

Dorothy Smith, Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People (Lanham MD: AltaMira Press, 2005);
Dorothy Smith (ed.) Institutional Ethnography as Practice (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).
An article by Stephen Robertson also proved invaluable. Stephen Robertson, “What’s Law Got to Do with
It? Legal Records and Sexual Histories” (1995) 14 Journal of the History of Sexuality 161.

16

The English Court of Appeal denied my request for access to the Clark and Cannings files on the basis
that it considered a PhD to be a personal project, and presumably therefore exempt from the principles of
open justice. Challenging this decision was beyond my resources. Later in the study, the Victorian
Supreme Court returned all exhibits used in R v Matthey to the parties immediately after Coldrey J issued
his judgment criticizing the prosecution evidence and the expert testimony offered in R v Matthey (see
[2007] VSC 398). These exhibits had been used in open court and would otherwise have been available for
inspection as part of the court record. I had access to the transcripts of argument in the Supreme Court, and
the transcripts of the committal hearing. However, without the exhibits, it would be difficult to perform a
complete analysis of the case. These experiences eventually prompted me to write an article about the
concept and importance of open justice: Emma Cunliffe, “Open Justice: Concepts and Judicial
Approaches” (2012) 40(3) Federal Law Review 385.
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commission a review of all criminally suspicious cases in which pathologist Charles
Smith had been involved.17 This review concluded that there were serious errors in 20 of
45 cases, and the Goudge Inquiry was announced while the Ontario Court of Appeal and
Supreme Court of Canada began to review individual appeals. This was welcome news
for the parents and caregivers who believed that they had been wrongly convicted or
unfairly accused of killing children, and those who supported their cause. It also made
researching these cases much more of a moving target.
In the end, after much worry, and many consultations with my PhD committee, we
decided that I would focus on a close analysis of the Australian cases and draw the
English and Canadian cases in for context rather than direct study. I obtained copies of
large portions of the Folbigg and Phillips files, and set to work persuading the Victorian
courts to give me, at least, the transcripts in Matthey. By mid-2007, I had all of these
materials. I also had the sense from time spent with the documents in the court registry
that Folbigg was different from the other cases – the Crown evidence was more
troubling, more complicated, perhaps more evenly weighted. I decided to write a chapter
for the imagined dissertation explaining the Folbigg case. After it had been drafted, I met
again with my committee and much to my relief my supervisor suggested that I focus
solely on Folbigg going forward. Six years later, the ‘progression’ of my PhD
dissertation from nine cases in three jurisdictions, to three cases in one jurisdiction, to
focusing on a single trial is a subject of amusement among my committee – but at the
time, it felt like an enormous gamble to write about ‘only one case’.
Another thing I hadn’t anticipated when I began the project was that it might take me
deep into the published medical literature. However it became apparent from early
reviews of the expert testimony that it would be helpful to read the cited material. This
led me to wonder how that material fitted with a broader field of medical research and
ultimately I read everything I could find about the relationship between SIDS and
homicide. Reviewing this literature, seeking to understand individual conclusions, the
limits of those conclusions and the intellectual genealogy of a body of work as a whole,
took months and required me to develop a somewhat different set of skills from those I
had so far used to analyze the court record. I was fortunate to find Sheila Jasanoff’s
work18 and that of Gary Edmond19 early in my research, as their (slightly different)
conceptualizations of the relationships between legal and expert knowledges became the
theoretical scaffolding that structured my approach to both the medical literature and the

17

Goudge, above note 8, volume 2 at 30-1.

18

Particularly Sheila Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science and Technology in America (Cambridge
MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

19

See the works cited below, note 20.
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expert witnesses’ work in Folbigg. Edmond’s early work on expert testimony offered a
model for careful analysis of the claims and discursive contests within experts’ work in
court.20 Linking that literature to Smith’s idea that institutional knowledge circulates
through texts and is activated by the work of people21 gave me a sense that it might prove
fruitful to trace the connections and interruptions between published medical research,
expert reports and testimony.
This combination of methodological choice and theoretical approach informed my
conclusions in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood and ultimately led particularly to the
recommendations I have made for managing expert evidence. I am heartened that San
Roque finds these suggestions pragmatic and capable of ready implementation even as I
am conscious that, requiring courts to re-conceptualize expert knowledge, they are
unlikely to be fully embraced in the near future. Nonetheless, I think the concept of
double counting – the idea that courts should be attentive to the possibility that expert
opinions are informed by the very adverse behavioural evidence and implicit prejudice
that is often relied upon by triers of fact to ‘validate’ those opinions – is an important one,
and I will explore it further in future work.
I make a point of relating the ‘backstory’ to my doctoral work each year to the graduate
students I teach in my methodologies class, because I think it illustrates the ways in
which research projects are shaped by accidents and opportunities. I make a point of
telling the story here because Darian-Smith has praised my methodological approach for
its range and for the way in which it is integrated with my theoretical lens. The
methodological challenges presented by this project seemed immense at times, and if I
have succeeded in meeting those challenges, it is at least partly because I had a
supervisory committee – Susan B. Boyd, Wesley Pue, Christine Boyle and Dorothy
Chunn – who encouraged me to be flexible and creative in my approach, and to persevere
with empirical work in the face of unexpected difficulties. I am very grateful to them for
the trust they placed in me as I found a way through it all.

Transitions: From academic work to media engagement
As I was preparing the book for final publication, I faced two decisions that I found
difficult. First, how bluntly would I state my conclusion that Kathleen Folbigg had been
wrongly convicted? Secondly, what steps could and should I take to draw attention to my
20

Gary Edmond, “Azaria’s Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of the Chamberlains’
Guilt and Innocence” (1998) 22 Melbourne University Law Review 396; Gary Edmond, “Constructing
Miscarriages of Justice: Misunderstanding Scientific Evidence in High-Profile Criminal Appeals” (2002)
22 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 53.

21

Smith, A Sociology for People, above note 15, chapter 8.
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conclusions? As I have already identified, Folbigg’s trial seemed in certain respects
better managed than many of the trials that were approximately contemporaneous with it.
The trial judge did not permit expert medical witnesses to testify directly to the dogma
that the presence of multiple deaths in a given family suggested murder, reasoning that
this opinion was based on common sense rather than expertise.22 Nonetheless, I found
that this logic entered the trial in invidious ways, some of which made this reasoning
more difficult for the defence to contest than might have been the case if the opinion had
simply been directly attested to.23 There were, additionally, strong hints that some of the
experts were influenced by Kathleen Folbigg’s diaries and perhaps by other inculpatory
evidence when they testified about cause of death in individual children. Craig Folbigg,
Kathleen’s estranged husband, likewise changed his testimony in a way that was
considerably more damning than his previous statements to police and Crown. The
diaries were used by the Crown prosecutor in a manner that could well have left the jury
uncertain about what Kathleen Folbigg wrote, and how Tedeschi (the prosecutor)
interpreted those entries. All of these strategies were troubling, and each proved difficult
for the defence to counter at trial.
While recognizing that this was a difficult case to defend, I was also somewhat critical of
some of the choices that had been made by Folbigg’s defence team at trial. Most
particularly, when the Crown suggested that the jury could use Folbigg’s interest in
physical fitness, or her evenings out with friends, or her occasional desire to work outside
the home, or her frustration at Craig’s refusal to help with household chores to discern a
possible motive for her to kill her children, the defence responded by suggesting that
these hadn’t been Folbigg’s true desires at all. As a feminist (frankly, as an adult woman
living in an OECD country), it seemed astonishing to me that the defence had not also
challenged the Crown’s reasoning.
The notion that a reason to murder one’s children can be discerned from a desire to be fit,
a concern about whether her husband would find her attractive when she felt overweight,
a wish to share household work more equally or a desire to have her own money and to
help secure the financial stability of her family seems absurd when decontextualized from
its application to a woman who was already suspect by virtue of having lost four children
and being charged with their murder. The apparent salience of these (contested) facts
demonstrates the importance of framing – they mattered because Folbigg had lost her
children and because she was charged with murder. The possibility that this reasoning
might put the cart before the horse was never adequately addressed at trial. Rather, in the
context of the trial, the bizarreness of the Crown’s logic went largely unchallenged and
22

R v Kathleen Folbigg, unpublished decision of Barr J, 7 May 2003.

23

The discursive and strategic moves that permitted this re-emergence are traced in Murder, Medicine and
Motherhood at 73-79.
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the logic was at times actively supported by the defence strategy of accepting the
category, but denying that Folbigg fitted within it.
The defence was undoubtedly surprised by Craig Folbigg and Lea Bown’s24 testimony
that Kathleen had occasionally been rough with Laura. This testimony was at odds with
prior statements, and was cross-examined on that basis. Again, however, the defence
didn’t squarely challenge the proposition that murderous tendencies can be discerned
from, for example, holding down a child’s hands in frustration when she resists eating her
breakfast – preferring instead to deny that such incidents had occurred. Like San Roque,
I am perturbed by the apparent ease with which the NSW Department of Public
Prosecutions has leveraged a particularly punitive – at times misogynistic – vision of
contemporary womanhood in the service of convicting women for crimes that may never
have occurred, and by the implications that these strategies may have for every woman
who struggles at times with the frustrations and loneliness of mothering. It also troubles
me that these moves were not targeted, and countered, by the defence at trial. Yet these
moves are not unique to Folbigg, nor even – as Clark and Cannings demonstrate – to
NSW. I suspect that they are rarely countered in criminal courts as strongly as they
should be.
There were also some positive indicia of factual innocence in Kathleen Folbigg’s case.
In Cannings, the English Court of Appeal made much of the fact that none of Cannings’
children had any signs of smothering on autopsy:
It is of course possible to smother a baby without leaving any physical signs discernible on
medical examination or at post mortem. Nevertheless, given that all four children were said
by the Crown to have been subjected to violence sufficient to cause death, the absence of
any physical signs of injury was somewhat surprising. There was no fresh copious bleeding
in the lungs of the dead children, and no petechial haemorrhage. There were no pressure
marks to show as reddening in the area of the mouth and nose, nor blood or bloodstained
fluid in the nose. No bruises were discovered on the outer skin surface, or indeed
subcutaneously. The fraenulum, in each case, was undamaged.25

The four Folbigg children were likewise free from all signs of foul play. This was
important in aggregate, and perhaps most striking in relation to Laura, who was well
above the age at which it is normally considered possible to smother an infant without
detection, and whose autopsy was conducted by a pathologist who strongly suspected
homicide based on the family history. Each of the children was autopsied, and in two
cases (Patrick and Laura) investigating doctors identified a plausible natural cause of
death at the time of autopsy. In relation to both of these children, doctors testified at trial
24
25

Lea Bown is Kathleen Folbigg’s foster sister.
R v Cannings [2004] EWCA 1 at para 160.
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in a manner that was inconsistent with earlier conclusions, but without explaining the
reasons for their change of opinion. In fact, the jury would have had to work hard to
realize that the medical opinions had changed at all.
Likewise, Folbigg had none of the risk factors identified in the literature as predisposing
a mother to smothering her children. This remains true even when one includes studies
that have been criticized as being unduly suspicious of women.26 Craig Folbigg did not
suspect Kathleen of having killed their children until he spoke to police and subsequently
read Kathleen’s diaries after she had left him, and them, in the marital home. When
Craig told Kathleen that he had suggested to police that Kathleen may have killed their
children, Kathleen told Craig to go back to the police station and ‘tell them the truth’.27
The Crown case at trial was that Folbigg killed her children and then immediately raised
the alarm. The Crown made much of some evidence that the two children who died at
night were found by Folbigg as she went to the toilet – San Roque has quoted Tedeschi’s
sarcastic comment about Folbigg’s bodily functions. There was conflicting evidence
about whether the children’s bodies were cool to the touch when they were found – but
this was not drawn to the court’s attention. It is clear from the 2007 appeal that this
factor mattered to some jurors (and to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal).28
Collectively, the lack of physical signs of foul play after careful assessment; the presence
of positive indicia of natural causes; the lack of risk factors; the possibility that the bodies
of the children who were found at night were cool to the touch when attended by
ambulance personnel; the lack of suspicion of Folbigg by her closest family and friends;
and her immediate response to the revelation that she was now suspect, suggest that there
may be good reasons to believe that Folbigg did not kill her children.
When I was writing the manuscript that became Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, I
was not particularly looking for evidence of factual innocence, or even for evidence of an
error that could found a claim of wrongful conviction. I was, as I have already noted,
interested in what prompted the trend towards charging mothers who suffered multiple
infant death, keen to understand the implication of changing concepts of motherhood and
medical science in this trend, and I hoped to investigate the links between these matters
and the criminalization literature. I am grateful to Darian-Smith and San Roque for
26

This research is discussed at length in chapter five of Murder, Medicine and Motherhood. Perhaps,
Kathleen Folbigg’s early childhood could be interpreted as constituting a difficult upbringing. Barr J
construed her history in this way when sentencing Folbigg (R v Folbigg [2003] NSWSC 895). However,
by most accounts she was a relatively settled child and teenager and one should be careful before
generalizing from an infant history to adult findings of criminal guilt when there is an intervening period of
unexceptionable behaviour and a capacity to form personal relationships.

27
28

Craig testified at trial that he interpreted this direction as a coded injunction to lie to police.
R v Folbigg [2007] NSWCCA 371 at para 8 and 56-9.
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focusing on these dimensions of the book in their comments. They remain, for me, the
core of the academic project and the factors that will continue to animate my work.
However, in light of the evidence that militated against Folbigg’s guilt, I decided to state
clearly that I believed Folbigg had been wrongly convicted. NSW does not have any
corresponding institution to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, and so the question
of what might happen next was far from clear.
I did not correspond with Folbigg until the proofs were finalised. When the contract with
Hart was signed, however, I reached the conclusion that it was important to alert Folbigg
to my conclusions and offer to send a copy of the book to her.29 The letter I received in
response put the essential conundrum I now faced into devastating clarity. Rather than
protesting her ill treatment within the justice system, Folbigg wrote: ‘If this is purely for
publication … then I would appreciate being informed of this. As hope can destroy as
much as enliven ones soul.’ Receiving this letter, I was aware of both my relative lack of
capacity to offer practical help – as an academic lawyer working in another country, with
no practising certificate – and of the enormous privilege I enjoy by virtue of my
education and institutional position. I resolved to do what I could to find Folbigg a
lawyer who could act on her behalf, and that I would also try to draw the media’s
attention to my conclusions.
Murder, Medicine and Motherhood is deeply critical of the press coverage of Folbigg’s
trial. Based on my quantitative and qualitative analysis of that coverage, I concluded that
the press systematically ignored the challenges made by various witnesses to the Crown
narrative of the case, and thereby presented an imbalanced account of the evidence in
Folbigg’s trial. My decision to try to enlist the media’s help to reverse the conviction felt
ironic, at best. Dorothy Chunn, who has taught me so much about media and media
analysis, assured me however that the press would care less about consistency in its own
reporting than it would about the newsworthiness of a credible claim that Folbigg may
have been wrongly convicted. Her prediction proved right, and my efforts resulted in
several favourable stories, particularly in the Sydney Morning Herald. The 60 Minutes
and Alan Jones Show followed in mid-2013. I hope, though I don’t yet know, that these
stories will help Folbigg to persuade the court of public opinion that there may be more to
her case than was first reported.
As feminist scholars might anticipate, the journalists I have spoken to have been much
more interested in the failures of institutional processes that formed part of the
investigation and trial than they have been in my analysis of the ways in which Folbigg’s
29

Debra Parkes and I had a number of conversations about whether to approach Folbigg, and if so by what
means. Her wisdom and her greater experience with women in prison were instrumental to the strategy we
formulated, and I appreciate Debra’s generosity in helping me to find a suitable way to alert Folbigg of the
book’s existence while ensuring that she had adequate support and that her privacy was respected.
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mothering was punitively enlisted against her. This focus is consistent with the coverage
afforded to Sally Clark, Angela Cannings, and the Canadian exonerees. To the extent
that a story of miscarriage of justice has gained traction in the media, it has largely
excluded the concerns about the targeting and disciplining of women that San Roque
articulates in her piece in this issue, and that I sought to raise in Murder, Medicine and
Motherhood. A feminist narrative has thereby been stripped out of a more conventional
liberal account of the rational expectations of criminal justice and medical institutions.
My experience of engaging with the media in Folbigg’s case resonates with the
conclusions drawn by Dorothy Chunn, Susan Boyd and Hester Lessard in their study of
feminism, law and social change. Speaking about law reform, these authors observe that:
While they never controlled the agenda-setting process, feminists have been active and
influential to varying degrees in proposing and shaping socio-legal reform … However, the
broader social and economic forces represented by neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism
have an important mediating influence on the impact that feminism can achieve.30

Chunn, Boyd and Lessard conclude that feminist successes have been strongest when
feminists have found common cause, or strategic alliance, with strands of neoconservatism or neo-liberalism. This conclusion has important ramifications for feminist
academics, who are increasingly finding their performance judged against criteria such as
‘impact’ – including the extent to which one’s work is embraced within political, judicial
or public discourse. The assumption that merit is the only criterion by which academic
work will be judged within these spheres is unsettled by studies such as Chunn, Boyd and
Lessard’s.
In keeping with the media interest in ‘how it feels’ to experience reported events,31 60
Minutes and the Sydney Morning Herald have also featured interviews with Kathleen
Folbigg’s friends and foster sister. While Folbigg’s foster sister remains convinced that
Folbigg killed her children, her friends quietly supported her throughout her trial and
imprisonment. In this most recent phase, the media attention has been reconfigured and
Folbigg’s friends have assumed a prominence that they did not have during the trial and
appeals. The implicit message being promoted appears to be that Folbigg’s friends are
ordinary, loving women who are also mothers – and who cannot conceive that their
friend committed the crimes of which she was convicted. This aspect of the reportage
30

Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan B. Boyd and Hester Lessard, “Feminism, Law & Social Change: An
Overview” in Dorothy E. Chunn, Susan B. Boyd and Hester Lessard (eds), Reaction and Resistance:
Feminism, Law and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007) at 4.
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See Murder, Medicine and Motherhood at 168-70; Richard Ericson, Patricia Baranek and Janet Chan,
Representing Order: Crime, Law and Justice in the News Media (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1991) at 35.
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has exhumed Folbigg’s humanity in place of the ‘monster’ who was previously depicted
in the media.32 It appeals to the emotional dimensions of the case – inviting readers to
consider for the first time the awful possibility that Folbigg may first have lost four
children, and then been wrongly convicted of killing them. However, this reportage also
sidesteps the question of how and why Folbigg was portrayed so differently by the
prosecution and in the media in the initial phases of the case. In particular, while the
diaries have occasionally been reproduced and discussed in this media coverage, there
has been relatively little sustained consideration of the role they might have played in
Folbigg’s mothering and her grief about her children’s deaths. The observations that I
made in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood about the implications of the privatization
and gendering of responsibility for early childhood, and the ways in which this
responsibility has been harnessed by Crown prosecutors to the task of rendering some
mothers suspect,33 have (predictably) been wholly ignored within the media coverage.
San Roque’s piece in this issue demonstrates the extent to which such prosecution
strategies are, in fact, reinforced by the media coverage of cases in which women are
prosecuted for homicide.

Works in progress
As I prepare this response, the final chapter of Folbigg’s case remains incomplete. The
moderate success of efforts made by several people to draw attention to concerns about
the evidence given at Folbigg’s trial provides some reason to hope that the convictions
may be reviewed. However, the mechanism by which this may happen remains unclear.
Having exhausted normal avenues of appeal, Folbigg’s quandary illuminates the
inadequacy of NSW’s mechanisms for criminal review. As San Roque and Gary Edmond
have argued, Folbigg’s case and others also demonstrate that the ethical obligations
imposed on prosecutors and experts do not substitute for vigilant judicial oversight of the
evidence introduced against criminal defendants.34 I will continue to do what I can to
draw my conclusions to the attention of those who may be in a position to review
Folbigg’s convictions. Despite the positive reception my work has enjoyed, Folbigg
remains in prison, locked in a protective ward in a maximum security women’s facility
that is housed inside a men’s prison on the outskirts of Sydney.
While I work to correct the injustice that has been done in Folbigg’s case, however, I am
grateful to Darian Smith and San Roque for focusing on the systemic implications of my
32
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Science and the Frailty of the Criminal Trial” (2012) 24 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51.
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research. These implications extend to the relationships between punitive visions of
motherhood, medical opinions that are deeply imbricated with social stereotypes, and
legal processes in which existing checks and balances have failed to prevent errors from
occurring. Taking a broader view of the failures that led to wrongful convictions in
England, Canada and Australia permits the Folbigg case to be seen not as an aberration,
but as a telling instance of the failures of contemporary conceptions of the relationships
between gender, crime and truth-seeking. While such discussions may find their greatest
resonance within academic circles, I remain convinced that they offer the most fruitful
path towards a more egalitarian model of fact determination in difficult criminal trials.
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